nadim/appliedcryptography
SHA256
1
Fork 0
Code Wiki Activity

Website: greatly improved materials viewing experience

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Nadim Kobeissi 2025-06-26 13:13:47 +02:00
parent 4b6498ede3
commit d5a06032b0
Signed by: nadim
SSH key fingerprint: SHA256:o0JJHYcP8LVBoARMU+JjVbzJxL3HxW2F+C0yu/5zPgc
406 changed files with 159269 additions and 184 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

54
slides/1-4.tex
View file

@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@
\begin{columns}[c]
\begin{column}{0.4\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item Luby and Rackoff proved that a 3-round Feistel cipher is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation.\footnote{\url{https://appliedcryptography.page/papers/luby-rackoff.pdf}}
\item Luby and Rackoff proved that a 3-round Feistel cipher is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation.\footnote{\url{https://appliedcryptography.page/papers/\#luby-rackoff}}
\item Can we also prove it using our provable security framework?
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
@ -1520,7 +1520,7 @@
\begin{columns}[c]
\begin{column}{0.4\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}
\item Luby and Rackoff proved that a 3-round Feistel cipher is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation.\footnote{\url{https://appliedcryptography.page/papers/luby-rackoff.pdf}}
\item Luby and Rackoff proved that a 3-round Feistel cipher is indistinguishable from a pseudorandom permutation.\footnote{\url{https://appliedcryptography.page/papers/\#luby-rackoff}}
\item Can we also prove it using our provable security framework?
\item Yes, with the bad events proof technique!
\end{itemize}
@ -2130,31 +2130,31 @@
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}{AES: security and attacks over time}
\begin{columns}[c]
\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item AES has been heavily analyzed for over 20 years.
\item Best attacks against full AES have gradually improved:
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item 2011: Biclique attack (Bogdanov et al.) reduced complexity to $2^{126.1}$ for AES-128.
\item Various side-channel attacks developed (power analysis, cache timing).\footnote{This is the main way to attack AES in practice. Side-channel attacks will be discussed in more depth later in the course.}
\item Advances in meet-in-the-middle and related-key techniques.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item Despite these advances:
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item No practical attacks on full AES-128.
\item Best attacks still require $\approx 2^{126}$ operations.
\item At this complexity, attacks remain purely theoretical.
\item Would require resources far exceeding global computing power.
\end{itemize}
\item Even quantum computers offer only modest advantage (Grover's algorithm reduces security to $2^{64}$ operations).\footnote{More on quantum computers and how they affect cryptography later in the course.}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\begin{columns}[c]
\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item AES has been heavily analyzed for over 20 years.
\item Best attacks against full AES have gradually improved:
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item 2011: Biclique attack (Bogdanov et al.) reduced complexity to $2^{126.1}$ for AES-128.
\item Various side-channel attacks developed (power analysis, cache timing).\footnote{This is the main way to attack AES in practice. Side-channel attacks will be discussed in more depth later in the course.}
\item Advances in meet-in-the-middle and related-key techniques.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth}
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item Despite these advances:
\begin{itemize}[<+->]
\item No practical attacks on full AES-128.
\item Best attacks still require $\approx 2^{126}$ operations.
\item At this complexity, attacks remain purely theoretical.
\item Would require resources far exceeding global computing power.
\end{itemize}
\item Even quantum computers offer only modest advantage (Grover's algorithm reduces security to $2^{64}$ operations).\footnote{More on quantum computers and how they affect cryptography later in the course.}
\end{itemize}
\end{column}
\end{columns}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}[plain]